Perfectly Reasonable: The Overextension of Fourth Amendment Privacy Protections to Students and Their Cell Phones by Eyer, Daniel L.
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Student Scholarship
2014
Perfectly Reasonable: The Overextension of Fourth
Amendment Privacy Protections to Students and
Their Cell Phones
Daniel L. Eyer
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/king
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Student Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For more
information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniel L. Eyer, Perfectly Reasonable: The Overextension of Fourth Amendment Privacy Protections to Students and Their Cell Phones
(2014),
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/king/218
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perfectly Reasonable: The Overextension of Fourth Amendment Privacy Protections to Students 
and Their Cell Phones 
by 
Daniel L. Eyer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the 
King Scholar Program 
Michigan State University College of Law 
under the direction of 
Professor Kristi L. Bowman 
Spring, 2014  
1 
 
PERFECTLY REASONABLE: THE OVEREXTENSION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY 
PROTECTIONS TO STUDENTS AND THEIR CELL PHONES 
 
Daniel L. Eyer 
	  
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 2	  
I.	   BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................................... 4	  
A.	   The Touchstone Case:  New Jersey v. T.L.O. ................................................................... 5	  
B.	   Suspicion Based Searching Revisited – Safford Unified School District Number 1 v. 
Redding ....................................................................................................................................... 7	  
C.	   Current Cell Phone Searching Law ................................................................................ 10	  
1.	   New Issues Presented by Students and Their Cell Phones ......................................... 11	  
2.	   The First Wave of Lawsuits ........................................................................................ 12	  
D.	   The Sixth Circuit Blazes the Trail .................................................................................. 16	  
E.	   Internet Privacy Protection Laws ................................................................................... 19	  
II.	   THE BALANCE WEIGHS HEAVILY IN FAVOR OF THE SCHOOLS ............................................. 22	  
A.	   The Balancing Act .......................................................................................................... 23	  
B.	   Relevant Developments in Student First Amendment Law ........................................... 26	  
C.	   Don’t Tie the School’s Hands, or Don’t Hold Them Liable .......................................... 30	  
III.	   EXPECTATIONS OF STUDENT PRIVACY ................................................................................ 33	  
A.	   Students’ Subjective Expectation of Privacy in Their Cell Phones ............................... 34	  
B.	   Would Society Recognize the Student’s Expectation of Privacy as Reasonable? ......... 38	  
1.	   DeSoto Recognized the Illegitimacy of the Expectation ............................................ 39	  
2.	   Owensboro’s Misapplication of the Privacy Expectations ......................................... 41	  
IV.	   THE HARSH REALITY AND SAFE HARBOR POLICIES ........................................................... 44	  
A.	   Step 1: Ban and Confiscate ............................................................................................ 44	  
B. 	   Step 2: Articulate a Danger ............................................................................................ 46	  
C.	   The Minimal Impact of Password Protection Statutes ................................................... 50	  
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................. 53	  
 
 
 
 
2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 A high school student with a long history of drug use, emotional outbursts, fighting, and 
suicidal tendencies is caught violating school policy by using his cell phone during class.1 The 
assistant principal, now in possession of the phone and well aware of the student’s checkered 
past, is concerned about the student’s well-being and emotional reaction to the confiscation of 
his phone.2 The assistant principal decides, in the best interests of the child and for the safety of 
the school environment, to read four text messages on the phone to ensure that the student was 
not on the verge of some emotional tragedy.3 What would the reaction be to such an action by a 
school official? Would there be praise for his swift action to ensure the safety and well-being of 
the student? Would there be an acknowledgement that students can have no cause for complaint 
when they have their cell phone confiscated since they were well aware that possession and use 
of the phone during school is a clear violation of school policy? 
 No. In a stunning twist, the assistant principal and the school district were forced to fight 
a four year lawsuit defending themselves against accusations of violating the student’s privacy 
rights by looking through the four text messages on the cell phone.4 But the real shocker was still 
to come. Not only was the school forced to defend their actions in federal court, but the Sixth 
Circuit declared that the assistant principal’s actions were unreasonable and violated the 
student’s Fourth Amendment rights.5 The Sixth Circuit’s decision marked the first time a United 
States Court of Appeals had faced the issue of student cell phone searching, so its impact is sure 
to resonate through the hallways of schools throughout the country. 
                                                
1 This scenario is based on G.C. v. Owensboro Pub. Schs., 711 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2013), a recent case of 
first impression that was the primary inspiration for this article. 
2 Id. at 632. 
3 Id. at 633.   
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 634. 
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 Unfortunately for the school personnel, who are tasked with the monumental challenge of 
maintaining a safe and orderly educational environment, this result is just the latest in a series of 
pro-students’ privacy decisions by the nation’s judiciaries and legislatures that are tying the 
hands of school officials to deal with the ever-growing list of problems that cell phones in 
schools present. Bullying, cheating, sexting, disrupting class: cell phones are creating and 
intensifying all of these problems in the school environment.6 But as the problems and 
prevalence of cell phones continue to escalate, the school’s ability to deal with these problems is 
being further and further restricted. What is a school to do? How can the school respond? 
 Part I of this article explains the background and precedent dealing with students’ Fourth 
Amendment rights and their protection from “unreasonable” searches of their persons and their 
belongings. Part I also analyzes a very recent and very significant Sixth Circuit court decision 
that marked the first time a United States Court of Appeals faced the issue of cell phone 
searching. Part I concludes by examining the recently enacted internet privacy protection laws, 
which seem to work in tandem with the court decisions to severely restrict a school’s ability to 
deal with all of the problems presented by students’ cell phones. Specifically, Michigan’s 
Internet Privacy Protection Act will be discussed, since it represents the broadest of all state laws 
impacting student privacy and offers lessons that all schools throughout the country can take to 
heart. Part II argues that the balance of students’ constitutional rights and schools’ interests must 
be, and always has been, heavily tipped in favor of the schools’ interest in protecting its ability to 
educate and maintaining discipline in the school environment, and that limitations in other areas 
of constitutional law offer guidance and justification for limiting students’ Fourth Amendment 
rights in the privacy of their cell phones. Part II also addresses the incongruity between holding 
                                                
 6 For a rundown of various issues presented by student cell phone possession, see Joseph O. Oluwole & 
William Visotsky, The Faces of Student Cell Phone Regulations and the Implications of Three Clauses of the 
Federal Constitution, 9 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 51, 53-60 (2010).  
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schools liable for failures to prevent evils like bullying and school violence while also restricting 
their ability to combat these problems though cell phone searches. Part III addresses students’ 
subjective expectations of privacy in their cell phones, and suggests that although students may 
place a high expectation of privacy in their phones, these expectations are unfounded and 
unreasonable. Part III also presents the school’s case and suggests that the reasoning in the recent 
Sixth Circuit case is inconsistent with the constitutional reasoning applied in other student 
privacy rights cases. Part IV recognizes that although the balance should be tipped in favor of the 
schools, it presently is not. Therefore, policies regarding cell phone bans and searches that 
comply with the wishes of the courts and the legislatures are suggested and explained. These 
policies attempt to protect the schools’ interests as best as they can in spite of the harsh and 
difficult climate of student privacy that schools are currently forced to operate within. 
 This article attempts to aid school personnel by educating them on the past and present 
state of Fourth Amendment law as applied to the new and murky area of student cell phones. It 
suggests policies and practices that will best protect schools’ interests while still complying with 
the overly restricting law currently in force. However, it also offers schools an argument that will 
hopefully aid them in swaying the judiciary and the legislature back towards the path of allowing 
schools to protect their ultimate purposes and interests in preserving an orderly and positive 
educational environment. 
I. BACKGROUND  
Although there is no clear authority on the constitutional limits of suspicion-based7 cell 
phone searches in schools, there are clues scattered throughout other Fourth Amendment school 
                                                
7 The distinction between suspicion-based searching of students and suspicion-less searching of students is 
critical. The Court has upheld various suspicion-less searches of students, but although these cases will be passingly 
referenced throughout this article, they operate under a completely different set of rules than the suspicion-based 
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cases, various state statutes, and decisions by various lower federal courts that have dealt with 
the scenario. This part begins by reviewing the lessons learned from the Supreme Court’s 
seminal school Fourth Amendment cases. Next, the various lower federal court decisions that 
have tackled the cell phone search issue will be compared and contrasted with the goal of 
articulating some consistent policies and rules. Finally, the Sixth Circuit’s recent decision and an 
example of recent legislation on cell phone privacy will be highlighted, setting the stage for some 
preliminary guidance and model rules for public schools throughout the country to abide by. 
A. The Touchstone Case:  New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
The story of school and student Fourth Amendment jurisprudence finds its origins in New 
Jersey v. T.L.O..8 In T.L.O., a fourteen year old high school freshman was caught smoking in the 
bathroom, which was a clear violation of school policy.9 When questioned by the principal, 
T.L.O. denied any wrongdoing.10  Now suspicious, the principal searched T.L.O.’s purse and 
uncovered a pack of cigarettes.11 Unfortunately for T.L.O, that was not all the principal found. 
He also noticed some rolling papers, which he knew were used for smoking marijuana.12 The 
principal suspected that continuing the search would reveal additional evidence of drug use.13 
Sure enough, a thorough search of the purse revealed some marijuana.14 
But the principal still wasn’t done. He next opened a zippered compartment of the purse 
where he found an index card containing various names and letters, which is apparently classic 
                                                                                                                                                       
searches that are the focus of this article. For examples of suspicion-less searches, see Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. 
Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), Bd. of Education v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002). 
8 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
9 Id. at 328. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id.  
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evidence of drug dealing.15 T.L.O. was charged as a juvenile based on the evidence found by the 
principal and her subsequent confession.16 She attempted to defend herself by claiming that she 
had been unlawfully searched, which, if true, would have rendered the evidence from the search 
and her subsequent confession tainted and inadmissible at trial.17 
While acknowledging that the students do enjoy protection under the Fourth Amendment, 
the T.L.O. Court nevertheless ruled that schools required “some modification of the level of 
suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search.”18 In light of this proclamation, instead of 
requiring probable cause or a search warrant (the normal requirements for a search under the 
Fourth Amendment), the Court established an inquiry of “reasonableness, under all the 
circumstances, of the search.”19 This reasonableness test requires a two-part inquiry.  First, “one . 
. . [must] consider ‘whether the . . . action was justified at its inception.’”20  Second, one must 
“determine whether the search as actually conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’”21 For a search to be justified at 
its inception, a school official must have “reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will 
turn up evidence” that the student has been breaking either school rules or the law.22 To be 
permissible in scope, the search tactics employed must be “reasonably related to the objectives of 
the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature 
of the infraction.”23 The Court trusted that this test would neither “unduly burden” school 
                                                
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 329. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 340. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 341 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). 
21 T.L.O., 489 U.S. at 341 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20). 
22 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342. 
23 Id. 
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officials “nor authorize unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of schoolchildren.”24  Rather, 
the Court felt that the reasonableness test would allow school officials to search students 
“according to the dictates of reason and common sense.”25 
Applying this test, the Court ultimately concluded that the search did not violate T.L.O.’s 
Fourth Amendment rights.26 The principal’s search of the purse was reasonable because he had 
received a tip that she was smoking in the bathroom, and her denials provided a sufficient basis 
to search the purse for evidence of smoking.27 The papers he uncovered then gave rise to further 
suspicion that she was a drug dealer and justified his opening and reading of the letters.28 
Therefore, the scope was reasonable, since the extent of the search was reasonably related to the 
principal’s suspicion of finding drug related evidence. T.L.O. continues to be the touchstone case 
for student search law, and courts throughout the country have relied on its rules and reasoning 
when deciding the initial wave of student cell phone search cases. The impact of T.L.O. cannot 
be understated, and any forecast of future student search decisions must take it into account as 
the starting point of the analysis. 
B. Suspicion Based Searching Revisited – Safford Unified School District Number 1 v. Redding 
In establishing its reasonableness test, T.L.O. rejected the argument that students have no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in any personal property brought to school.29 However, the 
Court balanced any expectation of privacy in personal items like “photographs, letters, and 
diaries” with the school’s significant interest in preventing disruption and maintaining safety.30 
For over twenty years after T.L.O., the Supreme Court stayed clear of the issue of suspicion-
                                                
24 Id. at 342-43. 
25 Id. at 343. 
26 Id. at 332-33. 
27 Id. at 345. 
28 Id. at 347. 
29 Id. at 339. 
30 Id. at 326, 339. 
8 
 
based searches of students, but in 2009 they finally revisited the topic in Safford Unified School 
District Number 1 v. Redding.31 In Redding, the Court applied the T.L.O. reasonableness test to 
“strip searches.” In the case, school officials “strip searched” a thirteen year old female student 
by removing the elastic from her undergarments and pulling out her bra, where they suspected 
the student was concealing prescription drugs that she was distributing to her fellow students.32  
The Supreme Court both incorporated and expanded the T.L.O. standard in its resolution 
of Redding. According to Justice Souter, there is a three step inquiry that must be applied in 
order to determine the “reasonableness” of student search cases. The first step in the evaluation 
of an “invasive” search is to determine the student’s subjective expectation of privacy.33  The 
student’s expectation of privacy must be viewed in light of the humiliation, fear, and 
embarrassment that Redding experienced during the strip search.34 Redding herself drove this 
point home and met this first requirement when she testified about her own embarrassment and 
humiliation caused by the search.35  
The second step in the analysis is asking whether society would recognize her 
expectation of privacy as legitimate. The Court went to great lengths to confirm the legitimacy of 
Redding’s expectation of privacy by pointing to the similarity of attitudes among her peer group 
and the findings of social science research.36  Finding that Redding’s embarrassment, fear, and 
humiliation were “consistent” with the reactions of other students who experienced invasive strip 
searches, the Court determined that their “adolescent vulnerability intensifies the patent 
intrusiveness of the exposure” of the search.37 The Court relied upon the “common reaction” of 
                                                
31 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No.1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (2009). 
32 Id. at 2637-38. 
33 Id. at 2638. 
34 Id. at 2641. 
35 Id.  
36 Id.  
37 Id. at 2641-42. 
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children to a strip search, as identified by social science studies, to confirm the legitimacy of the 
expectation and allow Redding to prevail on the second part of the inquiry.38  
The third step is necessary only when the first two steps establish both that the student 
possessed a subjective expectation of privacy and that the expectation of privacy is objectively 
reasonable.39 Here, Redding relied heavily upon T.L.O., quoting the language that the search “as 
actually conducted [must be] reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place.”40 The search’s scope is reasonable “when it is ‘not excessively 
intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.’”41 With 
regards to Redding’s strip search, the Court found that the “content of the suspicion failed to 
match the degree of intrusion.”42 The school officials in Redding knew that the contraband pills 
were merely common over the counter pain relievers, and therefore they represented only 
“limited threat” of danger.43 Due to the limited nature of the threat, the school officials could not 
justify the “extreme intrusiveness of a search” of Redding’s underwear.44  The Court found the 
argument that students typically hide contraband in their underclothing unpersuasive, and called 
the search overly extensive.45 They justified their finding by declaring that, “nondangerous 
school contraband does not raise the specter of stashes in intimate places,” and, mere “general 
background possibilities” are insufficient to justify a strip search of a student, due to “the 
degradation its subject may reasonably feel.”46  
                                                
38 Id. at 2642. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985)). 
41 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2642 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342). 
42 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2642. 
43 Id. 
44 Id.  
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 2643. 
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Redding is the most up to date Supreme Court jurisprudence on suspicion based student 
searching. It refined T.L.O.’s reasonableness test by taking into account the student’s subjective 
expectation of privacy as well as society’s willingness to recognize that expectation as legitimate 
when analyzing the invasiveness and reasonableness of the search. Since Redding is the latest 
student suspicion based searching decision, any new search cases will take its reasoning into 
account when applying the T.L.O. test. Therefore, it is highly probable that whenever the new 
and uncharted question of student cell phone searching comes before the Supreme Court, 
Redding will play a decisive role in the outcome. 
C. Current Cell Phone Searching Law 
Generally speaking, courts recognize that people have a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in the contents of their cell phones.47 Cell phones contain vast amounts of potentially private 
information, including recent-call list, emails, texts, and photos.48  Generally, the private nature 
of the contents of a cell phone “gives users a reasonable and justifiable expectation of a higher 
level of privacy in the information they contain.”49  Due to this legitimate expectation of privacy, 
in the general (non-school) setting, a search warrant is usually required for a search of a cell 
phone, unless an exception exists.50 However, as T.L.O. made clear, different rules apply in the 
school environment. These differences are a topic of much debate, since the prevalence and 
reliance on cell phones is growing at a rapid rate amongst our nation’s youth. 
 
                                                
47 For examples of cases that recognize a legitimate expectation of privacy in cell phones in non-school 
settings, see United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 577 (5th Cir. 2008); Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 
F.3d 892, 905 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Quintana, 
594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1299 (D. Fla. 2009); Connecticut v. Boyd, 992 A.2d 1071, 1083 (Conn. 2010); Ohio v. Smith, 
920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009). 
48 Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 1299 (citing Zavala, 541 F.3d at 577). 
49 Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 955. 
50 Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 1299. Police officers that make a lawful arrest do not need a warrant to 
conduct a search incident to that arrest. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); New York v. Belton, 453 
U.S. 454 (1981); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
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1. New Issues Presented by Students and Their Cell Phones 
The ever increasing number of students bringing phones to school has sparked a variety 
of new problems and headaches for school staff. Cell phones offer students the opportunity to 
engage in all kinds of mischief, including texting during class, setting up illegal drug sales, 
cheating on tests, sexting, and bullying their peers.51 A growing number of schools have 
instituted policies banning cell phones outright, but these policies are futile, since about two-
thirds of students at these schools bring them anyway.52 These policies are further undermined 
by parents who refuse to support the schools’ efforts. For example, in 2007, parents of New York 
City public school students actually sued the school after it instituted a cell phone ban.53   
Since outright bans are completely ineffective, schools often attack the problem with 
strict confiscation policies.54 Further, some schools authorize searches of cell phones after they 
are confiscated. Courts have tolerated these searches of confiscated phones where there is 
reasonable suspicion of a violation of school rule or of law,55 following, to the best of their 
ability, the T.L.O. standard. However, these searches are being challenged with more and more 
frequency in court.56 
                                                
51 Amanda Lenhart et al., Teens and Mobile Phones: Text Messaging Explodes as Teens Embrace It as the 
Centerpiece of Their Communication Strategies with Friends, PEW INTERNET (Apr. 20, 2010), at 1,5,9, available at 
http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2010/PIP-Teens-and-Mobile-2010-with-topline.pdf; Zach Miners, One 
Third of Teens Use Cellphones to Cheat in School, U.S. NEWS ON EDUCATION BLOG (June 23, 2009), 
http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/on-education/2009/06/23/one-third-of-teens-use-cellphones-to-cheat-in-
school. 
52 Lenhart, supra note 51, at 83. 
53 Price v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 837 N.Y.S.2d 507 (Sup. Ct. 2007), aff'd 855 N.Y.S.2d 530 (App. 
Div. 2008). 
54 For an example of a Michigan cell phone confiscation policy, see DETROIT PUBLIC SCHOOLS, RIGHTS 
AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF STUDENTS IN THE DETROIT PUBLIC SCHOOLS 15-16 (2011), available at 
http://detroitk12.org/resources/students/codeOfConduct/Student_C  
55 Mendoza v. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., No. H-09-3895, slip op. at 22 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2011). See also 
ACLU OF CALIFORNIA, HELLO! STUDENTS HAVE A RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN THEIR CELL PHONES: INDISCRIMINATE 
CELL PHONE SEARCHES VIOLATE STUDENTS' PRIVACY RIGHTS (Sept. 2011), available at 
http://www.aclusandiego.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/H-E-L-L-O-student-cell-phone-rights.pdf 
56 See, e.g., Mendoza v. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., No. H-09-3895, slip op. at 22 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2011); 
J.W. v. DeSoto County Sch. Dist., 2:09-CV-00155-MPM, 2010 WL 4394059 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 2010); N.N. v. 
Tunkahannock Area Sch. Dist., 801 F. Supp. 2d 312 (M.D. Penn. 2011). 
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2. The First Wave of Lawsuits 
The courts have handled these challenges to student cell phones searches by applying the 
T.L.O. two-part “reasonableness” test: first, they must examine the reasonableness of the initial 
justification for the search, and second, they must decide whether the scope of the search was 
reasonable.57 Courts are not apt to declare the scope of a search of the entire contents of a phone 
as reasonable.58 For example, in Klump v. Nazareth Area School District, a teacher, following 
school policy banning the use and display (but not the possession) of cell phones, confiscated a 
student’s cell phone after it fell out of his pocket.59 School officials then listened to the student’s 
voice mail, read the student’s texts, and called several numbers in the phone’s contact list in an 
attempt to catch other students breaking the school rules by answering their cell phones during 
school.60 Eventually, evidence of drug activity was found.61 The student sued the school 
claiming, among many other things, Fourth Amendment violations.62  
Applying T.L.O.’s two-part reasonableness inquiry, the court found that seizing the phone 
was justified because the student had violated a school policy by displaying the phone.63 
However, the court decided that the search was not reasonable in scope, since the school had no 
justification to search the contents of the phone or to use the phone as a tool to entrap other 
students.64 School officials had no reasonable suspicion to suspect that the student was violating 
                                                
57 Bernard James, Safe Schools, Cell Phones, and the Fourth Amendment, NASRO J. OF SCH. SAFETY, 
Winter 2009, available at http://law.pepperdine.edu/academics/faculty/publications/James-
NASROCellPhoneLaw.pdf. 
58 Amy Vorenberg, Indecent Exposure: Do Warrantless Searches of a Student's Cell Phone Violate the 
Fourth Amendment?, 17 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 62, 83 (2012). 
59 Klump v. Nazareth Area Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 2d 622, 627 (E.D. Penn. 2006). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 631. 
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 640. 
64 Id. 
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any other school policy at the time of the confiscation.65  Therefore, because the text about drug 
activity was not apparent to officials until after they unreasonably began searching the contents 
of the phone, the search was disallowed.66  
Similarly, in Mendoza v. Klein Independent School District, a teacher confiscated an 
eighth grader’s phone after observing her looking at it with some friends.67 Because the students 
appeared “guilty” when they were confronted, the teacher deduced that they were doing 
something inappropriate.68 The teacher searched through the text messages and found nude 
photos of the student.69  The student confessed that she had sent the photos to her boyfriend,70 
and she was soon suspended.71 She subsequently sued the school, among other reasons, for 
violating her Fourth Amendment rights.72 The court decided that the search was justified at its 
inception because the student claimed she was not using the phone, but the teacher’s 
observations created reasonable suspicion that she was.73 Therefore, it was reasonable for the 
teacher to check if the student had violated school policy by sending a text at school.74  However, 
the school’s motion for summary judgment was denied, since the court believed that a jury could 
find that reading the texts on the phone was not reasonably related to the initial justification for 
searching the phone.75  
However, the students have not had it all their way. In J.W. v. DeSoto County School 
District, a twelve-year-old boy was expelled from school for gang activity after his cell phone, 
                                                
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Mendoza v. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., No. H-09-3895, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2011). 
68 Id. at 3. 
69 Id. at 3-4. 
70 Id. at 4. 
71 Id. at 5-6. 
72 Id. at 7-8. 
73 Id. at 22. 
74 Id. at 22-23. 
75 Id. at 27. 
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confiscated for in-class use, was found to contain a picture of a friend engaged in gang 
behavior.76 The court found that the search of the student’s cell phone was reasonable both at its 
inception and in scope because the student brought it to school and used it against clear school 
policy.77 This behavior diminished the student’s expectation of privacy,78 thereby making a 
search of the phone reasonable. The DeSoto court distinguished the case from Klump, calling 
Klump a “fishing expedition” into the student's personal life.79 Here, the school’s actions were 
“limited” to only looking at the student’s photos.80 The case was later settled.81 
  The ACLU has also become heavily involved in student cell phone searches. For 
example, in 2007, the ACLU challenged a Colorado school district’s cell phone searching 
policy.82 School administrators had been routinely confiscating cell phones after minor 
infractions and then reading the phone’s texts.83 The ACLU challenged the policy, arguing that it 
violated state law and the Fourth Amendment.84 The school district agreed to implement new 
rules that require school officials to obtain either student or parental permission before searching 
a cell phone unless there is an imminent danger to school safety.85  
In California, the ACLU made a similar complaint. There, a school administrator 
confiscated a student’s phone and allegedly proceeded to read several weeks of prior text 
                                                
76 2:09-CV-00155-MPM, 2010 WL 4394059, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 2010). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at *5. 
80 Id. 
81 Press Release, ACLU, Mississippi School District to Clarify Gang Policy as Part of Settlement of ACLU 
Lawsuit (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/mississippi-school-district-clarify-gang-
policy-part-settlement-aclu-lawsuit. 
82 See Letter from American Civil Liberties Union to Bd. of Educ., Boulder Valley Sch. Dist. (Oct. 10, 
2007), available at http://aclu-co.org/sites/default/files/BVSD_ACLU_10-10-07.pdf. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Applauds Boulder Valley School District’s Decision to Limit Searches of 
Students’ Cell Phone Text Messages (Apr. 21, 2008), available at http://aclu-co.org/news/aclu-applauds-boulder-
valley-school-district%E2%80%99s-decision-to-limit-searches-of-students%E2%80%99-cell-pho. 
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messages that included “personal” communications.86 In response, the school agreed that school 
officials would not search the text messages of confiscated cell phones unless they had 
reasonable suspicion that they would find evidence of a violation of law or school rules.87 The 
school also agreed to limit the scope of any searches to information pertaining directly to the 
alleged infraction that led to the initial confiscation.88 Finally, the ACLU of Pennsylvania sued a 
school district after the principal searched a student’s phone and uncovered “explicit” photos, 
which the principal then submitted to law enforcement.89 The case was settled, but the school 
paid a steep price by paying the plaintiff $33,000 and agreeing to formulate clearer guidelines for 
cell phone searches.90  
So, as these scattered and inconsistent decisions indicate, both schools and courts 
continue to struggle with understanding and implementing the T.L.O. “reasonableness” test to the 
new world of student cell phones. The need for clarity is critical, because as cell phone 
ownership and use continues to increase, these occurrences will only become more common. 
Teachers and principals are going to be faced with this issue on a daily basis, and they are going 
to need to be able to act quickly and confidently to properly address any disciplinary issues 
raised by the cell phones. Blanket bans have proven ineffective, so there does not seem to be any 
easy way out of the problem. Confiscation policies are dominant, but the guidelines and 
circumstances for when a school official can search the confiscated phone remain unclear. As 
T.LO. indicated, students do not enjoy the same level of constitutional protection as adults, so 
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16 
 
student cell phone searching by school officials falls into a hazy and confusing no-man’s land. 
However, with all of the recent litigation and the constant stream of ACLU challenges, a 
resolution of this controversy cannot be far off. 
D. The Sixth Circuit Blazes the Trail 
Meanwhile, the Sixth Circuit finally faced the issue of student cell phone searches for the 
first time last year in G.C. v. Owensboro Public Schools.91 This was the highest court to ever 
take on this issue, so the case is sure to draw attention, criticism, and analysis from across the 
country, and its effect will be felt by students and schools no matter where they reside. Our 
student, G.C., had a long history of disciplinary violations, including incidents where G.C. 
admitted to drug usage and having suicidal thoughts.92 The incident in question was not the first 
time that a school administrator had searched G.C.’s cell phone, but the search in question 
occurred in September 2009 when G.C. was caught texting on his cell phone during class in clear 
violation of school rules.93 The teacher confiscated the phone and turned it over to an assistant 
principal, who in turn read four of G.C.’s text messages.94 The assistant principal testified that 
she was aware of G.C.’s previous issues with suicide, and wanted “to see if there was an issue 
with which I could help him so that he would not do something harmful to himself or someone 
else.”95 She was also worried because she “was aware of previous angry outbursts from [G.C.] 
and that [he] had admitted to drug use in the past. I was concerned how [he] would further react 
to his phone being taken away and that he might hurt himself or someone else.”96 
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In its two-to-one decision, the court admitted that the situation was a novel and 
unprecedented one, noting that the no circuit had yet attempted to “address how the T.L.O. 
[reasonableness] inquiry applies to the search of a student’s cell phone.”97 For guidance, the 
court looked in depth at some of the previously discussed cases from Mississippi and 
Pennsylvania. It first analyzed the DeSoto case, citing the Mississippi court’s statement that, 
“[u]pon witnessing a student improperly using a cell phone at school, it strikes this court as being 
reasonable for a school official to seek to determine to what end the student was improperly 
using that phone.”98 The Owensboro court ultimately rejected the school-district friendly DeSoto 
approach as too broad, reasoning that, “Under our two-part test, using a cell phone on school 
grounds does not automatically trigger an essentially unlimited right enabling a school official to 
search any content stored on the phone that is not related either substantively or temporally to the 
infraction.”99 
Instead, the Owensboro court endorsed the students’ rights friendly Klump approach.100 
The Owensboro court relied on Klump for the proposition that in determining the legality of the 
search, the court must consider only the information that the officials possessed when the search 
commenced.101 The court was persuaded by the Klump reasoning that the school personnel “did 
not see the allegedly drug-related text message until after they initiated the search of [the] cell 
phone. Accordingly . . . there was no justification for the school officials to search [the] phone 
                                                
97 Id. at 632. 
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for evidence of drug activity.”102 The Owensboro court concluded that the fact-based analysis in 
Klump more accurately reflects their standard than the “blanket rule” utilized in DeSoto.103 
The Owensboro court also ruled that mere general background knowledge of drug abuse 
or depressive tendencies is not enough to qualify a school official’s search of a student’s cell 
phone as reasonable.104 The Court reasoned that school officials had no specific reason at the 
inception of the search to believe that G.C. was engaging in any unlawful activity or that there 
was a threat of injury to himself or another student.105 G.C. was simply sitting in class when his 
teacher caught him sending texts with his phone.106 The school officials failed to present any 
evidence that indicated that a search of the phone would reveal criminal activity or potential 
danger to anyone else in the school.107 Therefore, in the court’s view, the school did not have a 
reasonable suspicion to justify the search at its inception.108 
However, the ruling was not so clear cut and unanimous. Judge Alan Norris strongly 
dissented, stating that, “School officials are acting in loco parentis and, as such, they have a keen 
interest in student welfare and safety. For that reason, they must be allowed more leeway under 
the Fourth Amendment than is appropriate outside the school setting.”109 Based on the assistant 
principal’s knowledge of G.C’s previous fights, drug usage, and suicidal thoughts, Judge Norris 
believed that the assistant principal’s search, which was limited to reading four text messages, 
was reasonable under T.L.O..110 
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The decision stirred up plenty of response and controversy. The New York Times lauded 
the decision as wise.111 However, another commentator was shocked by the pro-students’ rights 
decision, especially in light of the unusually sympathetic facts weighing in favor of the school.112 
First, the student had a long record of disciplinary issues, and this incident was in fact the last 
straw leading to his expulsion.113 Second, the student’s suicidal tendencies were well 
documented, and the assistant principal justified the search by expressing her concern for his 
mental health, a seemingly noble and sympathetic cause.114 Finally, the search was quite narrow 
(merely four messages), rather than a “wholesale fishing expedition” into the student’s social 
media, photos, and emails contained on the phone.115 But, despite all of these facts weighing in 
the school’s favor, the Sixth Circuit was not persuaded. Owensboro sent a powerful message to 
the schools throughout both the Sixth Circuit and the rest of the country: the Fourth Amendment 
applies with force to students and their cell phones, even when the phones are seized in violation 
of school rules. 
E. Internet Privacy Protection Laws 
The courts are not alone in their movement towards affording greater privacy protection 
to students in their cell phones. State and federal legislators around the country “sought to ride 
the wave of public sentiment by introducing [and passing] legislation to slam the door on the 
perceived abuse” by schools.116 In 2012 alone, fourteen states117 and Congress118 introduced 
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legislation to restrict both schools and employers from requesting that students or employees 
surrender passwords for their personal accounts and personal electronic devices (e.g.., cell 
phones). Today, these password privacy statutes have been passed in at least fourteen states.119 
The trend towards password protection of cell phones and social media sites is made readily 
apparent by the fact that in 2013, thirty six more states considered similar statutes.120 With this 
powerful movement towards password privacy protection, schools simply must take the potential 
consequences of such laws into account when conducting cell phone searches. 
Michigan’s Internet Privacy Protection Act (IPPA) provides the perfect example for 
assessing the potential impact of these password protection laws on the school environment, 
since Michigan’s law extends broader protection to students than any other state statute, applying 
to students at all levels and to both cell phone and social media passwords.121  It therefore 
represents the strictest limitations that have been placed upon schools, so the lessons learned 
from adhering to its provisions will be applicable when adhering to any state’s limitations. 
Michigan’s IPPA is a law intended to prohibit “educational institutions from requiring certain 
individuals to grant access to, allow observation of, or disclose information that allows access to 
or observation of personal internet accounts” and to prohibit “educational institutions from 
                                                                                                                                                       
117 Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
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updated Jan. 17, 2013). At least 36 states considered  bills in 2013. Employer Access to Social Media Usernames 
and Passwords 2013, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/telecom/employer-access-to-social-media-passwords-2013.aspx (last updated Sept. 12, 2013). 
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taking certain actions for failure to allow access to, observation of, or disclosure of information 
that allows access to personal internet accounts.”122 According to the statute, schools may not: 
 (a) Request a student or prospective student to grant access to, allow observation 
of, or disclose information that allows access to or observation of the student’s or 
prospective student’s personal internet account. 
(b) Expel, discipline, fail to admit, or otherwise penalize a student or prospective 
student for failure to grant access to, allow observation of, or disclose information 
that allows access to or observation of the student’s or prospective student’s 
personal internet account.123 
 
According to the IPPA, “personal internet account” means “an account created via a bounded 
system established by an internet-based service that requires a user to input or store access 
information via an electronic device to view, create, utilize, or edit the user’s account 
information, profile, display, communications, or stored data.”124 Cell phones surely fit squarely 
within this definition.   
 The IPPA forbids schools from requesting students to disclose passwords that would 
allow access to students’ phones and internet accounts, since Section 2(a) defines “access 
information” as “user name, password, login information, or other security information that 
protects access to a personal internet account.”125 However, as this is a very recently enacted 
statute, there are no cases or scholarly articles dealing with or interpreting the meaning of the 
law. Unfortunately, as is often the case for schools, no one tells them what the law means, but 
they are still very much bound by it. School districts need guidance on dealing with the statute 
and in crafting policies that effectively balance their interests in protecting the safety of the 
school with the legislature’s desire for greater student privacy. 
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A leading Michigan law firm notes that the IPPA is designed to prevent schools from 
requesting access to student’s social media accounts, such as Gmail, Facebook and Twitter.126 
The firm also highlights the complexity of the issue and the significance of the IPPA by warning 
school districts to “tread carefully” when searching a student’s cell phone.127 Failing to do so 
could lead to liability under the Fourth Amendment as well as under the IPPA.128 However, since 
there is no additional guidance offered by the courts or the legislature on how to comply with the 
IPPA or the various other password protection laws enacted in other states, the firm offers no 
additional advice beyond the ominous warning of “tread carefully”. 
 The IPPA and other laws like it alert us to the legislatures’ concerns with the privacy of 
students in their cell phones. When paired with the Sixth Circuit’s recent decision in G.C. v. 
Owensboro, there exists an undeniable trend towards affording greater protection to students in 
their phones. However, historically students have not been afforded heightened constitutional 
protections, and schools have always been allowed greater leeway in protecting their interests. 
With the recent storm of student cell phone lawsuits discussed above, the time for authoritative 
and final rulings on the issue must come soon.  
II. THE BALANCE WEIGHS HEAVILY IN FAVOR OF THE SCHOOLS 
The Supreme Court has always recognized that students do not enjoy the same level of 
constitutional protection as adults due to the special circumstances and interests of the 
educational environment. This is why schools may restrict student speech in many situations 
where adults would be allowed to speak freely, and why schools can search students with 
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something less than a warrant or probable cause. Courts dealing with these constitutional rights 
issues are constantly balancing the students’ interests against the very real and compelling needs 
of the schools to maintain a safe and orderly educational environment. In some situations, 
schools can in fact be held liable for a failure to maintain that environment, such as when a 
student is victimized by bullying. The schools’ strong interest in preserving discipline and 
stopping harmful practices such as bullying, sexting, and drug dealing should be enough to 
justify searches on students’ cell phones once they are confiscated. The legislature and the courts 
need to make a decision on where their priorities lie: do we demand safety and order in the 
schools and hold them liable for not protecting their students and their environment but sacrifice 
students’ privacy in their cell phones, or do we tie the hands of the school to act and uphold the 
students’ privacy expectations, no matter what the cost? 
A. The Balancing Act 
The T.L.O. Court sought to ensure that its test neither “unduly burden[ed]” school 
officials “nor authorize[ed] unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of schoolchildren.”129  The 
Court felt that their reasonableness test would allow school officials to search students 
“according to the dictates of reason and common sense.”130 The test requires the balancing of the 
school’s interest in protecting the educational environment with the students’ expectations of 
privacy. The students’ expectations will be dealt with later. For now, the focus is on the first part 
of the balancing equation: the school’s interest in protecting the school environment. 
First and foremost, cell phones are often linked with loss of instructional time, thereby 
undermining the entire educational purpose of the schools.131 Teachers are distracted from their 
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work when they are forced to investigate cell phone usage,132 and students are constantly 
distracted by the activity on their phones.133 However, although this loss of instructional time is 
devastating, it is far from the most severe interruption that cell phone possession and usage 
causes in schools. 
School officials are often overwhelmed by a sweeping variety of accusations, suspicions, 
and disputes, and, in response to these problems, they feel the need to search the contents of a 
cell phone.134 One of the primary student issues that raises a compelling need to search a cell 
phone’s content is the ever present evil of school bullying.135 Bullying is often perpetrated 
through the use of the internet, cell phones, and other digital technologies, in which cases it is 
commonly referred to as “cyberbullying.”136 Bullying through the use of cell phones may take a 
variety of forms, including, but not limited to, heated text-message exchanges, insults through 
social media posts, calls, e-mails, or text messages, impersonation (where one student steals 
another’s cell phone and sends harmful messages or images while posing as the cell phone’s 
owner), and even “cyberstalking.”137 This list is far from exhaustive, for it never ceases to amaze 
us what levels of creativity children can demonstrate when devising new ways to cause trouble. 
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Another potentially devastating use of cell phones is “sexting”. Sexting is defined as the 
“transmission of sexually charged materials” through text messages or photos.138 Sexting often 
coincides with “cyberbullying”, for many students who receive “sexts” forward these photos to 
other students out of either intrigue or spite, which inevitably leads to wide dissemination and the 
shameful embarrassment of the original sender.139  
These evils are not rare occurrences. For example, over 40% percent of students have 
reported witnessing or engaging in sexting.140 These school crimes are most often perpetrated 
(and often exclusively perpetrated) through the use of phone calls, text messages, e-mails, and 
social networking websites, and the evidence of cyberbullying and sexting can typically and 
sometimes exclusively be accessed by searching a cell phone’s content.141 But the need to 
investigate cyberbullying and sexting does not exhaust the list of reasons school officials have 
for searching students’ cell phones. Cell phones can be used to perpetrate any number of less 
serious violations of school rules or policies, including cell phone theft, use of the cell phone to 
call or text other students during class, and cheating on school work.142 At the other end of the 
spectrum, cell phones are often used as the “tools of the trade” in furtherance of serious crimes, 
like drug possession, use, or dealing.143 The list of evils made possible by cell phones is 
seemingly endless. 
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 In light of all of these evils that cell phones make possible, the balancing equation tips 
heavily in favor of the schools. Bullying, sexting, and cheating are potentially ruinous problems 
that damage students and destroy the school environment. Any court that analyzes student cell 
phone searches must take these heavy school interests into account when assessing the 
reasonableness of a search. The students’ privacy interests must be compelling indeed to 
outweigh these powerful and compelling school interests.  
B. Relevant Developments in Student First Amendment Law 
Although there has not been a major Fourth Amendment school case extending the 
authority for schools to search cell phones, there have been recent school cases that deal with the 
justifications for limiting students’ First Amendment rights. These recent First Amendment cases 
remind us that the original justifications for limiting students’ rights are still relevant, and that 
those justifications must be used when determining constitutional limitations in new and 
uncharted territories like student cell phone searching. These First Amendment cases also 
reiterate that when students defy school policy and the school’s mission, they subject themselves 
to greater restrictions to their constitutional rights. 
 The Supreme Court has long recognized that in the school setting, students’ First 
Amendment free speech rights are subject to special limitations.144  Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent School Community District145 was the first case to recognize that students had 
protected First Amendment rights when it famously pronounced that students do not “shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”146 However, 
although Tinker marked the first recognition of students’ constitutional rights, it also served as 
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the starting point for a series of ever increasing restrictions on student speech. Seventeen years 
later, in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,147 the Court distinguished Tinker and upheld 
differential treatment for students in the school environment and adults in “other settings” when 
it came to First Amendment free speech principals.148 Two years after that, the Court relied on 
Fraser and Tinker when asserting that students’ free speech rights must be analyzed through the 
lens of ‘”the special characteristics of the school environment.’”149 The Court’s latest student 
speech decision in Morse v. Frederick emphasizes and expands these limits on student free 
speech in ways that have significant implications for students’ Fourth Amendment rights.150  The 
actual holdings of Morse are difficult to identify due to the mess of necessary and partial 
occurrences. However, piecing together the various opinions, it is clear that Morse did confirm 
that punishment and restrictions for speech that presents a threat to the safety of the school and 
its students is constitutional, even when the same speech by an adult in other settings would be 
absolutely protected.151  
Morse was a First Amendment free speech case, but it identified a link between the 
Court’s First and Fourth Amendment decisions, first by reaffirming the decisions152 in Vernonia 
School District 47J v. Acton153  and Board of Education of Independent School District Number 
92 of Pottawatomie City v. Earls,154 two previous Supreme Court student Fourth Amendment 
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cases that upheld suspicion-less searches. The Court further connected the First and Fourth 
Amendment cases when it drew upon the seminal search case, T.L.O.,155  and made it crystal 
clear that these three student search cases together correctly utilized the “principles applied in 
[the Court’s] student speech cases.”156 Regardless of whether the issue is a First or Fourth 
Amendment one, the Morse Court recognized that ‘”special needs’ inhere in the public school 
context,’”157 and the limitation on students’ constitutional rights is often thereby justified. This is 
important, because T.L.O.’s application to cell phone searching is vague at best, since cell 
phones did not even exist at the time the case was decided. The Morse Court also reiterated the 
Vernonia holding that the T.L.O. reasonableness standard must be conducted from the 
perspective of the school’s “custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.”158  So, although 
the extent to which special needs of the school permit special limitations of students’ Fourth 
Amendment rights against unreasonable searches has not been defined by the Court when it 
comes to student cell phone searches, the direct confirmation of the connection between student 
speech cases and student search cases recognizes and legitimizes the ability of schools to rely 
upon the special mission and interest of the schools in protecting the safety of its students to 
justify otherwise unconstitutional searches, just as the Court has always relied upon those same 
interests  in order to restrict student free speech rights.159  
Morse relied heavily upon the reasoning in Vernonia, where school officials instituted a 
random suspicion-less drug testing program for all athletes.160 The Morse Court held that 
“deterring drug use by schoolchildren is an ‘important-indeed perhaps compelling’ interest.”161 
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The Court then pronounced that “part of a school’s job is educating students about the dangers of 
illegal drug use.”162 Next, Morse linked Tinker’s recognition of ‘”the special characteristics of 
the school environment’” with the “governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse” to 
describe the threatening nature of the drug-related speech in Morse as “serious and palpable.”163 
So, as a starting point, when there is a threat to the school environment, a school should be 
justified in limiting a student’s Fourth Amendment rights, just as the school was permitted to 
limit the student’s First Amendment rights in Morse. Further, by linking the decision to 
Vernonia, the Court endorsed not only “reasonable” searches of students, but suspicion-less 
searches of students when the student has subjected themselves to lesser expectations of privacy 
by participating in extracurricular activities.164 
Morse’s reasoning makes it clear that schools may specially limit student Fourth 
Amendment rights when the student runs afoul of public school policies that are in place to 
assure the safety of the students. Students obviously run afoul of these policies when they 
possess and use cell phones against school rules, since their possession and use may lead to all of 
the problems discussed above.165 Schools must be able to respond nimbly and confidently to 
counter threats to the educational environment. The ruling in Morse appears to permit broad 
authority for school officials in the field of student cell phone searches whenever the school 
environment is threatened. As T.L.O. put it, schools officials cannot be bogged down in lengthy 
investigations and individualized suspicion requirements when such considerations “would 
unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed 
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in the schools.”166 These same principles should apply in these new student cell phone search 
cases. 
C. Don’t Tie the School’s Hands, or Don’t Hold Them Liable 
Amidst all of the recent cases and trends reinforcing students’ rights to privacy in their 
cell phones, greater expectations and demands are being placed upon the schools to prevent the 
very evils that cell phone searching could help to eliminate. For example, forty-nine states have 
legislation in place to prevent bullying.167 Every single one of these states have made schools 
liable for failures to prevent bullying.168  
 Even worse for the schools is that when these cases are litigated, they often become a 
public spectacle in which the school receives almost no sympathy. For example, a recent Georgia 
bullying case that resulted in a teen’s suicide169 generated plenty of negative publicity, despite 
the fact that school was ultimately found not liable.170 As awareness of bullying increases, so too 
does parents’ expectations of schools to prevent it. The recent onslaught of devastating lawsuits 
is indicative of this trend. Just within the last three years, we have seen jury verdicts awarded 
against the schools for failure to prevent bullying in the staggering amounts of 4 million, 1.7 
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million, and over 16 million dollars.171 This does not even include several other multi-million 
dollar settlements.172 These awards and settlements clearly indicate that society (as represented 
by the juries) shares the parents’ expectation that schools should protect the children and prevent 
these incidents. Bullying is an example of the exact kind of threat to the school environment that 
Morse recognized.173 It is the kind of threat that justifies severe limitations on students’ 
constitutional rights. 
 As society’s expectations that schools prevent issues such as bullying increase, does it 
make sense to tie the hands of the schools from using some of the best tools at their disposal to 
combat it? As discussed in Part II.A, cell phones are commonly the “tools of the trade” for 
bullying, sexting, drug dealing, and countless other school evils. Cell phones clearly offer new 
possibilities for bullying, since harmful information can now be more quickly disseminated to a 
wider audience while the person disseminating the information may do so while cloaked in 
something like anonymity.174 In the past, bullies would need to confront their victims face to 
face.175 Now, the modern bully can cause serious damage through quick and mass dissemination 
of electronic messages without even exposing him or herself. This relative anonymity allows for 
even harsher acts of bullying since the perpetrator never sees the pain or fear of the victim and 
faces little risk of being caught.176  
Furthermore, the evidence of bullying is often exclusively found in the contents of a cell 
phone. When the only evidence of the bullying is found in the cell phone, school personnel need 
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to have the leeway to search the cell phone without the higher levels of particularized suspicion 
that courts have previously required. Otherwise, how would they ever become aware of the 
bullying that they are tasked with stopping? 
Cell phones offer greater opportunities for more severe acts of bullying and help to 
perpetrate the exact types of bullying incidents that the state liability statutes are designed to 
prevent. Schools cannot be subjected to legislation and lawsuits for failing to deal with issues 
like bullying when they are forced to refrain from utilizing some of the best methods at their 
disposal for stopping it, since a simple and limited search could turn up the very evidence that 
they need to stop the problem. It places teachers and staff, who know their students well from 
constant and daily interaction and observation, in an extremely difficult situation where their 
instincts, prior knowledge of students, and current observations, while not rising to the level of 
reasonable and particularized suspicion, warn them that there might be a situation that needs 
investigating and addressing. They can see and sense that something is wrong, but they cannot 
take one of the most powerful options they have to rectify the situation.  
  This is no suggestion that students have no Fourth Amendment rights in school settings. 
However, as we have seen in both the First and Fourth Amendment cases above, the 
constitutional rights of one student are consistently held to be limited when weighed against the 
greater safety and discipline of the school environment. This is exactly the type of threat to the 
school environment that Morse recognized as worthy of limiting students constitutional rights in 
order to combat.177 A school free from bullying, sexting, drugs, and distraction is undoubtedly 
something that all educators and legislators would aspire to, but this cannot be achieved without 
some cost to student privacy rights. The laws and court decisions that place a heavy duty on 
schools to prevent issues like bullying are simply incongruent with the recent trends in student 
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cell phone privacy protection. Schools cannot be held liable for issues like bullying in situations 
where a checkup on the contents of a cell phone might have prevented the incident. In an ideal 
world, schools would be able to protect both the safety and the privacy of students, but this is 
simply unrealistic. We cannot have it both ways. If schools are responsible for the safety of our 
students, then they must be able to take the necessary actions in order to ensure that threats are 
eliminated. The legislature and the courts need to make a call: do we allow violation of the 
students’ privacy and hold the schools liable, or do we tie the hands of the school in order to 
maintain privacy for the students?  The goal of protecting the safety of the students and the 
school environment is a worthy one, and the laws that hold schools liable for failing to protect 
their students are perfectly aligned with the schools’ missions. While protecting students’ 
privacy rights is a noble goal, protecting students from bullying and other threats is a far more 
significant and worthy objective. The balance between protecting the school and protecting the 
students’ privacy simply must tilt in favor of stopping the threat and protecting the safety and 
well-being of the students. If this causes students to lose some privacy in their cell phones, then 
so be it. 
III. EXPECTATIONS OF STUDENT PRIVACY 
Courts nationwide have not gone out of their way to identify some heightened 
expectation of privacy in cell phones when the target of the search has already been caught in 
violation of law, and they have almost unanimously upheld police searches of cell phones 
incident to arrest.178 It seems, then, that students who are caught violating school policy by using 
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their cell phones might be subject to a similar search incident to their “arrest.” After all, why 
would school students receive higher protection than adults, especially when students are 
generally afforded lesser protections? 
T.L.O. established that searches must be reasonably related in scope and not “excessively 
intrusive in light of age and sex of the student.”179  This standard inevitably leads to several 
questions: what is “intrusive” when it comes to searching a student’s cell phone? What exactly is 
a reasonable expectation of privacy for a high school student in their cell phone?180  This is a 
tricky and contentious issue because it is very well established that an expectation of privacy 
analysis measures both an individual’s subjective view and society’s objective view of what is 
reasonable.181 However, what is clear is that if a student’s expectation of privacy in a cell phone 
is unreasonable, then a search of that phone cannot possibly be “unreasonable” either at its 
inception or in its scope. In this light, it becomes clear that although a student’s subjective 
expectation of privacy in their cell phone is important, more attention must be paid to society’s 
view of the reasonableness of this expectation when determining the reasonableness of any cell 
phone search. 
A. Students’ Subjective Expectation of Privacy in Their Cell Phones 
The students’ expectation of privacy is initially critical, since it is the first factor that 
ultimately determines what level of suspicion is required to make the search reasonable. Looking 
back at various cases, it seems that a student’s expectation of privacy in their person and their 
belongings falls along a continuum. The more intrusive the search, the more suspicion is needed 
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in order for the search to be “reasonable.”182  Locker searches fall close to one end of the 
spectrum, due to the low level of intrusion.183 Strip searches fall on the opposite end of the 
spectrum, because searching a student’s body embarrasses and exposes the student.184 Officials 
must have a higher level of individualized and specific suspicion of the student’s wrongdoing or 
of a potential threat posed by the object of the search in order to legitimize a strip search of a 
student.185  
The law does tell us that pockets, backpacks, and purses are subject to stiffer guidelines 
than lockers, but they do not require quite the same the level of suspicion necessary for a strip 
search.186 Searches of these items are likely permissible only when school officials have specific 
information that a student possesses drugs, weapons, or some similar threat.187  Anonymous tips 
and rumors, on the other hand, do not justify a search of these personal items.188  However, even 
if the tip is anonymous, if it includes information about drugs, weapons, or some other item that 
poses a risk to student and faculty safety, courts usually allow the search.189 Despite the high 
level of intrusion, courts will defer to the school’s interest in a protecting a safe environment for 
the children.  
So students have little expectation of privacy in their lockers, and conversely they have a 
higher expectation in their backpacks, purses, and bodies. But how can we apply these lessons to 
                                                
182 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643. 
183 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 (“[A] search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are 
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the 
student and the nature of the infraction.”). 
184 See Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643. 
185 Id. 
186 In re J.N.Y., 931 A.2d 685 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). 
187 See, e.g., State v. Drake, 139 N.H. 662, 667 (1995) (pockets and backpacks); Matter of Gregory M., 627 
N.E.2d 500, 582 (N.Y. 1993) (backpacks). 
188 In re J.N.Y., 931 A.2d at 688-89; see also Texas v. K.C.B., 141 S.W.3d 303, 309 (2004) (finding that 
the possible presence of drugs on a student does not warrant searching a student's undergarments when the suspicion 
is based on an anonymous tip). 
189 Thomson v. Carthage Sch. Dist., 87 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2004) (weapon possession); In re Cody S., 
16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 653, 655-56 (Ct. App. 2004) (weapon possession); In re Boykin, 237 N.E.2d 460 (Ill. 1968) 
(weapon possession). 
36 
 
new contexts and situations, such as the expectation of privacy in a cell phone? In Redding, 
Justice Souter took on the issue of privacy expectations in new situations by considering the 
student’s own subjective feelings of embarrassment, humiliation, and fear when a school official 
ordered her to pull out her bra and the elastic on her pants.190 Souter utilized a “semi-objective” 
measure, concluding that the “reasonableness of her expectation (required by the Fourth 
Amendment standard) is indicated by the consistent experience of other young people similarly 
searched, whose adolescent vulnerability intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the exposure.”191  
Souter’s standard asks us to look at the level of intrusiveness from the perspective of a typical 
adolescent, rather than a “reasonable person.”192  Therefore, to answer our question of what a 
student’s reasonable expectation of privacy is in their cell phone, we must decide how intrusive a 
cell phone search is to a student.193 
Much of the recent legal commentary on this issue advocates heavily for the position that 
students possess extremely high expectations of privacy in their cell phones, with some even 
suggesting that the expectation is so high that increased standards, such as warrants or probable 
cause, are required for a search.194 The general reasoning goes like this: modern cell phones 
contain a wealth of information and are routinely used by teenagers as a source of 
communication.195 Cell phones allow access to documents, websites, and countless “apps”, all of 
which are reflections or extensions of the student’s life.196 Teenagers consider cell phones so 
essential that they might be called “virtual appendages”.197 This essential nature can be 
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quantified: teenagers send approximately fifty text messages per day, and upwards of fifteen 
hundred texts per month.198  Those numbers make it clear that cell phones have become the 
primary mode of communication for teenagers.199 Many teens reported that they use text 
messages every day to share private information, and about three quarters of teens use texts to 
share “personal matters.”200  Teens called their cell phones their “bonding resource.”201 
The personal nature of cell phones extends far beyond just texting and calling. Many 
teens use their phones to take and share pictures.202 They also use their phones to exchange 
videos, instant message, use the internet, access social network sites, and email.203 All of this 
data suggests that students place a great deal of personal and private expectation in the contents 
of their cell phones. Critically, this would place a cell phone closer to the “strip search” end of 
the spectrum, opposite the un-intrusive locker searches. If a student had their cell phone 
searched, they would potentially be subject to similar subjective feelings of embarrassment, 
humiliation, and fright that the strip searched girl in Redding experienced.204  After all, it must be 
remembered that a student’s special “adolescent vulnerability intensifies the patent intrusiveness 
of the exposure.”205  From the perspective of an adolescent, the level of intrusiveness of a cell 
phone search is high, thereby requiring a similar level of suspicion as a strip search to qualify as 
“reasonable”.  
As a starting point, it is foolish to attempt to place oneself in the head of a teenager and to 
try to understand the teen’s subjective feelings and expectations. Giving so much credence to the 
outlook and perspective of a teenager opens this argument up to all sorts of criticism. But it can 
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be conceded that teenagers might very well place massive expectations of privacy in their cell 
phones. For the purposes of this article, this argument will be granted, because, even if it is 
conceded, it only answers half of the questions that need to be asked. The second critical 
question in the expectation of privacy test is whether society would be willing to recognize the 
expectation of privacy as legitimate. Now, let us turn to the question of whether society would 
really be willing to recognize a teenager’s expectation of privacy in a cell phone, which has been 
brought to school and used against clear school policy, as reasonable. 
B. Would Society Recognize the Student’s Expectation of Privacy as Reasonable? 
Notably absent from the courts’ opinions in both Klump and Owensboro is any discussion 
of the second part of the classic Katz test that Souter incorporated into the Redding analysis: 
whether society is willing to recognize the student’s expectation of privacy as reasonable.206 Katz 
and Redding both analyzed a Fourth Amendment search and found that a search could only be 
unreasonable if the target of the search had a subjective expectation of privacy in the object or 
place of the search and that society was willing to recognize that expectation of privacy as 
reasonable.207 The holdings in Klump and Ownensboro focus entirely on a student who chooses 
to put various sorts of personal information in their cell phone. As recognized above, an adult’s 
expectation of privacy in their cell phone is generally recognized as reasonable by society.208 
However, just as we recognize a different search standard for students, society should hold 
students to a different standard when analyzing the reasonableness of their privacy 
expectations.209 So, is society willing to go so far as to recognize that students have a legitimate 
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expectation of privacy in an object that they have chosen to bring to school against school rules? 
This is where the justification for heightened protection of student cell phones falls apart. 
1. DeSoto Recognized the Illegitimacy of the Expectation 
The DeSoto court questioned the reasonableness of placing an expectation of privacy in a 
cell phone that was brought to school against clear school policy, even if it did not frame the 
analysis using that exact vocabulary. The student in DeSoto knowingly violated clear school 
policy that prohibited even the mere possession of cell phones.210 The phone then constituted 
“contraband”, and the student greatly increased his chances of being caught with that 
“contraband” (and of being suspected of further misconduct) when he made the decision to use it 
in school.211 The Desoto court felt that, after witnessing this violation, there was nothing 
unreasonable about following up by seeking to determine to what end the student was improperly 
using the phone.212 It may very well have been the case that the student was cheating or was 
communicating with another student who would also be subject to disciplinary action for 
improperly possessing and using a cell phone.213 Therefore, the student, with full knowledge that 
merely possessing the phone was a violation of school policy, willingly abandoned any 
legitimate privacy expectation that he had in the cell phone when he chose to both bring it and 
use it at school. 
The notion that students often knowingly and completely abandon their privacy rights is 
not a novel one. This very theory has been utilized previously by the Supreme Court in both 
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Earls214 and Acton215 when the Court reasoned that students sacrificed their expectations of 
privacy by participating in extracurricular activities. Their expectations were diminished so 
greatly that they were subject to suspicion-less searches.  
DeSoto recognized that the student knowingly and willingly brought the cell phone into 
school, which was a violation of school policy in and of itself, and he knowingly further 
increased his chances of being caught with it when he chose to use it. Does a student legitimately 
believe that when he is caught using his phone against the rules that the teachers or 
administrators simply will not care what he was using it for? Does he legitimately expect that 
there will be no follow up investigation to determine to what ends the phone was, against school 
rules, being used? Simply put, he might, but that expectation would hardly qualify as reasonable. 
This key fact that the cell phone was brought and used against school rules that banned 
even mere possession actually makes the DeSoto case reconcilable and consistent with Klump, 
despite the fact that the two cases came to completely opposite results. In Klump, the high 
school’s policy permitted students to carry, but not to use or display, their cell phones.216 In that 
case, the student’s cell phone inadvertently fell out of his pocket.217 Upon seeing it, a teacher 
enforced school policy by confiscating the phone. Subsequently, the principal began using the 
phone to make calls to other students listed in the phone number directory to determine whether 
they too were violating the school’s cell phone policy.218 The principal also accessed the text 
messages and voice mail, and held an instant message conversation with Klump’s younger 
brother, all while pretending to be Klump himself.219  
                                                
214 536 U.S. 822, 829-30 (2002). 
215 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995). 
216 Klump v. Nazareth Area Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 2d 622, 630 (E.D. Penn. 2006). 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. 
41 
 
So, in Klump, the student unintentionally violated school policy by having a cell phone, 
which the student was permitted to possess, fall from his pocket, a stark contrast to the DeSoto 
student who chose to use the phone when it was not even permissible to possess it at school.220 
The school officials in Klump then used that accident as an excuse to conduct a widespread 
“fishing expedition” into the student's personal life.221 This pre-textual fishing expedition is the 
kind of situation that raises Fourth Amendment concerns, not the limited and justified search of a 
the  phone that was brought to school against school rules in DeSoto. 
When the student made the decision to violate school rules by bringing a cell phone onto 
campus and by using it within view of teachers, the result was a diminished privacy expectation 
in the cell phone.222 Further, the school officials “search” of the phone, which was limited to 
merely looking at the photos on the cell phone, was far more justifiable than the widespread 
fishing expedition in Klump.223 When a student is caught texting in clear violation of school 
rules, society might still be willing to recognize the student’s expectation of privacy from a pre-
textual “fishing expedition” as reasonable. However, it is unreasonable for the student to expect 
that no limited inquiry into the illegal usage of the phone will be made, because they have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell phone that they have brought to school in a 
knowing violation of school policy. 
2. Owensboro’s Misapplication of the Privacy Expectations 
In light of this reconciliation between Klump and DeSoto, and of the recognition that 
society would not recognize an expectation of privacy in a cell phone that was knowingly 
brought to school against school rules as reasonable, it becomes clear that the Owensboro court 
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mischaracterized DeSoto’s reasoning and conclusion. Owensboro dismissed DeSoto, claiming 
that, “Under our two-part test, using a cell phone on school grounds does not automatically 
trigger an essentially unlimited right enabling a school official to search any content stored on 
the phone that is not related either substantively or temporally to the infraction.”224 But DeSoto 
was not creating an unlimited right or a blanket rule that enabled the school officials to search 
any and all of the contents of the phone. Nor did DeSoto endorse the widespread pre-textual 
“fishing expedition” of Klump. DeSoto simply recognized that students who bring cell phones to 
school against the rules and choose to increase the risk of being caught by using it at school no 
longer possess a legitimate expectation of privacy in the cell phone.  
In Owensboro, G.C. was caught texting on his cellphone in class in a knowing and willful 
violation of school rules.225 Upon confiscation, the principal read a mere four of G.C.’s text 
messages because he was concerned about G.C’s previous issues with drugs and suicide.226 
There was no “fishing expedition”. There was no pre-text. In fact, most of society might agree 
that it was completely reasonable to conduct a limited search of the phone to try and protect the 
student. Therefore, the search was reasonably justified at its inception and in its limited scope. 
The only unreasonable aspect of the case is recognizing the student’s expectation of privacy in 
the phone as legitimate. He gave that expectation up when he chose to bring it and use it against 
school policy. He made this choice despite the fact that he knew that the school administration 
was well aware of his past problems and would be suspicious of any unusual behavior. 
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In his dissent, Judge Norris recognized that schools “must be allowed more leeway under 
the Fourth Amendment than is appropriate outside the school setting.”227 Based on the illegal 
usage and possession of the phone and the school’s knowledge of G.C’s previous fights, drug 
usage, and suicidal thoughts, there was no legitimate expectation of privacy. Therefore, the 
assistant principal’s search, which was limited to reading just four text messages, was reasonable 
under T.L.O..228 It was not “overly intrusive”, for how can a search be intrusive when the student 
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the object of the search? There is no intruding, 
because there is no privacy to intrude upon. The search cannot be unreasonable when there was 
no reasonable expectation of privacy. Owensboro went too far in in protecting students’ rights, 
and made light of the school’s rules and interests.229 Such a ruling completely ignores the 
balance of student’s privacy interests and school’s interest in a safe and disciplined environment, 
and extends constitutional protection far beyond the limited rights recognized way back in 
T.L.O.. T.L.O.’s reasonableness test was supposed to balance these interests “according to the 
dictates of reason and common sense.”230 It is not common sense to recognize these expectations 
of privacy as reasonable, nor is it common sense to afford students the same heightened 
constitutional protections as adults while simultaneously ignoring the compelling safety and 
educational concerns of the school. This is the “special” school environment, and we thus need 
to focus less on the students’ subjective expectations of privacy, and more on what society would 
recognize as reasonable in light of the school’s mission of safety, education, and student well-
being. 
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IV. THE HARSH REALITY AND SAFE HARBOR POLICIES 
Unfortunately for school officials, the recent trends in these student cell phone search 
cases all seem to significantly favor the students’ expectations of privacy. As discussed, 
Owensboro endorsed an extremely student friendly approach despite overwhelmingly favorable 
facts for the school district.231 Although the case was decided incorrectly, it is, for now at least, 
the law. What are schools do to in this era of non-recognition of their interests? What steps can 
school officials take in their attempts to protect their interests and their students? 
A. Step 1: Ban and Confiscate 
According to the Supreme Court, “[S]chool officials needed the relatively unencumbered 
ability to maintain ‘discipline in the classroom and on school grounds.’”232 Cell phones can 
obviously disrupt this discipline, so the schools cannot just give up the fight and allow wanton 
use and possession of cell phones. The best way for schools to protect themselves from the 
potential distractions and disruptions caused by student use of cell phones is to exercise an 
outright ban on the possession of the devices.233 Schools absolutely possess the option of 
exercising a blanket ban on personal electronic devices.234 Further, once the policy banning the 
phones is in place, the school then also possesses the authority to seize the phones.235 However, 
often times schools try to be sensitive to parent and student expectations that students will have 
access to their cell phones, and sometimes even attempt to capitalize on the technology to engage 
students and facilitate learning in the classroom.236 These well-intentioned policies are errors 
with potentially devastating side effects. Many experts feel that students do not have the maturity 
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or self-control to resist use and abuse, thereby making enforcement of a limited use policy too 
difficult.237 Limited possession and use policies also present a huge pitfall: once schools sanction 
possession or use of cell phones on school property during the school day, they will then be 
forced to deal with the reasonable search issue.  By tolerating the possession or use of the 
phones, the illegitimate expectation of privacy articulated in this article will suddenly transform 
into a perfectly legitimate expectation of privacy. If the initial seizure of the phone is justified by 
the student simply possessing or using the cell phone against school policy, the school may be 
able to adopt the policy outlined by this article or the court’s reasoning in the DeSoto case in 
order to attempt to determine the ends to which the phone was being illegally used. However, 
without a ban, schools will find it even more difficult to seize a phone, and will not be able to 
make any arguments about a student’s lessened expectation of privacy due to the student 
knowingly violating school policy by merely bringing the phone into the school. They may also 
run into an “accidental” display case (like in Klump), and we know how that case turns out. 
 Therefore, as appealing as trusting students to bring and use their cell phones responsibly 
sounds, it would ultimately lead to too many headaches for the schools. Phone usage and 
possession lends itself to bullying, cheating, sexting, and disruptions.238 Without an outright ban 
and seizure policy, schools would have to articulate an additional initial reason to seize a phone 
beyond simply possessing and using, thereby further handicapping themselves in their fight 
against the evils that cell phones can create and escalate. Without a confiscation policy and ban, 
schools will find it difficult to get past the first hurdle: whether the search is justified at its 
inception. They also face a legitimately higher expectation of privacy, since simple possession is 
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not by itself a violation of school rules. For schools, the benefits of use and possession are 
simply not worth the downfalls of a limited usage and possession rule. 
B.  Step 2: Articulate a Danger  
T.L.O. rejected the argument that students have no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
any personal property brought to school.239 However, the Court balanced any expectation of 
privacy in personal items like “photographs, letters, and diaries” with the school’s significant 
interest of preventing disruption and maintaining safety.240  Redding applied this test to strip 
searches, and that case now demonstrates the likely path that the Supreme Court will take when 
ruling on student cell phone searches.241 In Redding, school officials, acting on the assistant 
principal’s direction, “strip searched” a thirteen year old female student.242 The assistant 
principal suspected the girl of distributing prescription drugs to other students in violation of 
school policy.243 This case is informative, since it sets out the worst case scenario for the schools 
by indicating the strictest standard that the Court could possibly adopt. However, it also 
represents the safe harbor standard for a school to follow. 
According to Redding, there is a three step inquiry that must be applied to student search 
cases. The first step in the analysis of an “invasive” search is to evaluate the student’s subjective 
expectation of privacy.244  The student’s expectation of privacy must be viewed in light of the 
embarrassment, fear, and humiliation that the student experienced during the search.245 As 
outlined above, cell phones contain pictures, messages, and other personal data. What student, 
the argument goes, would carry their entire private life in their phone if they expected that 
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someone would examine it without their permission? Redding herself emphasized this aspect of 
the argument when she testified about her own embarrassment and humiliation caused by the 
search.246  
The second step in the analysis is asking whether society would recognize the student’s 
expectation of privacy as legitimate. The Court went to great length to confirm the legitimacy of 
Redding’s expectation of privacy by pointing to the similarity of attitudes among her peer group 
and the findings of social science research,247  similar to the research described above in Part 
III.A. Finding that Redding’s embarrassment, fear, and humiliation were “consistent” with the 
reactions of other students who experienced invasive strip searches, the Court determined that 
their “adolescent vulnerability intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the exposure” of the 
search.248 The Court relied upon the “common reaction” of children to a strip search, as 
identified by social science studies, to confirm the legitimacy of the expectation.249 Although this 
author entirely disagrees with the Court’s determination on the second part of this test,250 it is 
likely that the Court would agree that society would recognize a student’s expectation of privacy 
in their cell phone as reasonable. 
The third step is necessary only when the first two steps establish both that the student 
possessed a subjective expectation of privacy and that the expectation of privacy is reasonable.251 
Here, Redding drew directly from T.L.O., quoting the language that “[T]he search as actually 
conducted [must be] reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place.”252 The search’s scope is reasonable “when it is ‘not excessively 
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intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.’”253 With 
regards to Redding’s strip search, the Court found that “the content of the suspicion failed to 
match the degree of intrusion.”254 The school officials in Redding knew that the contraband pills 
that she was suspected of possessing were merely common over the counter pain medications, 
and therefore they represented only “limited threat” of danger.255 Because of the limited nature 
of the threat, the school officials could not justify the “extreme intrusiveness of a search” of 
Redding’s undergarments.256  The Court found the argument that students typically hide 
contraband in their undergarments unpersuasive, and labeled the search as overly extensive.257 
The justified their finding by declaring that, “nondangerous school contraband does not raise the 
specter of stashes in intimate places,” and, mere “general background possibilities” are 
insufficient to justify a strip search of a student, due to “the degradation its subject may 
reasonably feel.”258  
This analysis greatly favors the students in any cell phone search controversy. Despite the 
position taken by this article, the Court gives great weight to a student’s subjective expectation of 
privacy, and nowhere discusses the issue of whether a student can have a legitimate expectation 
of privacy in phone that is brought to school against school policy (which should prove fatal to 
the argument).259 However, the Court looks past this and embraces social science research that 
says students will be embarrassed and frightened, so therefore we should recognize their 
expectation of privacy as legitimate.260 Due to the extreme expectation of privacy that students 
place in their cell phones, a court is likely to side with the student on the first two issues in the 
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reasonableness test. As long as courts recognize a significant privacy interest in student cell 
phones, the situation will continue to be dire for the schools, and the schools will have an 
extremely difficult (perhaps impossible) obstacle to overcome in the quest to justify their cell 
phone searches. 
So where is the safe harbor? Where can schools draw the line and be sure that when they 
search, they will not be violating the students’ constitutional rights? The Court saw the 
contraband pills as presenting a limited threat of danger in declaring the scope of the search to be 
too invasive and unreasonable.261 This indicates that a court will likely only accept a search of a 
student’s cell phone if there is specific and individualized suspicion of some real and “non-
limited” danger. What qualifies as dangerous enough to impress the Court remains to be seen, 
and is sure to be the cause of much future debate. What school officials are left with is a vague 
notion that there must be some specific and individualized suspicion of danger present before a 
search of a cell phone can be conducted. 
Conducting a limited search of four text messages when the principal was concerned 
about a student who had a long history of violence, drugs, and suicide was not enough to qualify 
as a real threat or danger in Owensboro. So what is a school to do? When a phone is seized, the 
school official must be able to articulate some real threat or danger of which there is likely to be 
evidence of in the contents of the cell phone before conducting any kind of search. Otherwise, a 
court will likely declare the search of the contents of the phone as too invasive and humiliating 
for a student. A model guideline for school personnel will specify that this real threat or danger 
must be present before any search can be initiated. School personnel must be trained to 
understand that whenever a search of a cell phone is conducted, a real threat of danger must 
accompany the search. It seems overly harsh and places strange and heightened demands on 
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school officials, but in the current “students’ rights” friendly era (at least students’ rights friendly 
in the realm of cell phone privacy expectations), this is the harsh reality that school officials face. 
This approach represents the worst case scenario for the schools, and is likely the strictest 
standard that could possibly be adopted. But the good news is that if the schools abide by this 
real danger policy, they will find the safe harbor as far as respecting students’ constitutional 
rights. 
C. The Minimal Impact of Password Protection Statutes  
Much has been made of the recent student password protection statutes,262 particularly 
the Michigan IPPA, with lawyers warning that schools must “tread carefully” in response to this 
new and highly restricting law.263 However, in light of the heightened standards for cell phone 
searching (and searching in general) articulated by Owensboro and Redding, the impact of IPPA 
and other statutes like it, although intended to heighten student privacy protection, will likely be 
minimal. The minimal impact of the IPPA is informative for schools throughout the country, 
since the IPPA offers the broadest protection to students of any of these password protection 
laws in terms of the types of passwords protected and the types of students included under its 
protections.264 Therefore, if the IPPA’s impact is minimal, so too will be the impact of any other 
password protection statute.265 
According to the IPPA, schools may not “request a student or prospective student to grant 
access to, allow observation of, or disclose information that allows access to or observation of 
the student’s or prospective student’s personal internet account.”266 The IPPA defines “access 
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information” as “user name, password, login information, or other security information that 
protects access to a personal internet account.”267 So, for our purposes, the act appears to simply 
forbid the school from forcing a student to disclose their cell phone’s password. The act says 
nothing about phone searches generally.  
The IPPA actually includes an exception to the general rule, making it clear that the act 
“does not prohibit or restrict an educational institution from viewing, accessing, or utilizing 
information about a student or applicant that can be obtained without any required access 
information or that is available in the public domain.”268 This seems to indicate that if the school 
administrator can meet the reasonableness requirement to search a phone, then, as long as they 
can guess the password or infer it from general knowledge, no additional obstacles are placed 
before them. 
This is consistent with general case law. Courts throughout the country have long held 
that police may search cell phones incident to arrest in the non-school setting.269 Scholarly 
literature on the topic agrees that police, in the non-school setting, face no additional troubles 
when searching a password protected phone incident to arrest.270 After all, police have long been 
able to search locked containers incident to arrest.271 Courts have never distinguished between 
locked and unlocked containers, which suggests that there is no greater expectation of privacy 
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when the arrestee has taken steps to protect the “private” contents of the container. Consistent 
with this locked container rationale, it seems likely that police will be permitted to search 
password protected cell phones incident to arrest, just as they may search an unprotected phone 
incident to arrest.272 Ultimately, passwords will do little to curb police searches of cell phones.273 
This logic would apply to the school setting as well, especially when the standards of 
searching and privacy are supposed to be lower than those applied in the “adult world.” As long 
as the password can be guessed or inferred from public knowledge, the presence of password 
protection presents no additional trouble. The only real impact of the IPPA (and other statutes 
like it across the nation) is that it prevents the school from forcing students to reveal their own 
passwords. The IPPA has the broadest impact and offers the greatest protection of any password 
protection statute, so if schools can abide by the IPPA, then their conduct will be acceptable 
under any state law.  
All in all, the real issue for schools is presented by Owensboro and Redding. Beating the 
“reasonable” suspicion test will be the true challenge, since the courts seem willing to extend a 
rather powerful expectation of privacy to students in their cell phones. If that (very high) hurdle 
can be overcome, than cracking the password presents no additional legal complication. Further, 
if the school can identify a threat of danger high enough to meet the test, than it is likely that they 
would have enough suspicion to justify a warrant or probable cause, in which case law 
enforcement could search the phone regardless of any password protection. Ultimately, although 
the various legislatures have attempted to protect the students’ privacy rights in their cell phones, 
their efforts are essentially meaningless, since the courts have already gone so far in protecting 
that privacy.  
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CONCLUSION 
 In recent years, the balance of student and school interests in the realm of cell phone 
searching has tilted heavily in favor of the students. The schools’ strong interest in preserving the 
safest and most orderly educational environment has taken a back seat to the students’ privacy 
interests in the contents of their cell phones, despite the fact that possession of the phone is often 
a violation of school policy in and of itself. While this is the wrong solution to the student cell 
phone problem, Owensboro and the various password protection statutes make it clear that this is 
the treacherous situation that schools must now cope with, and the situation shows no signs of 
changing anytime soon. As it is, schools must tread carefully when searching students’ cell 
phones, and they must be certain to have a real suspicion of a legitimate threat before embarking 
upon any search. Noble purpose and limited scope of the search cannot save the schools, and 
schools can be held liable for failing to stop evils like bullying, even where some limited cell 
phone searching might have prevented the whole incident.  
 Schools absolutely must keep bans on student possession and use of phones in place and 
continue to confiscate them whenever they are found. However, teachers and administrators must 
work to articulate a clear policy that the phones are only to be searched in the presence of some 
articulable suspicion of a “real” danger or a threat. This will ensure that the schools will at least 
operate in a safe harbor where they will not face constitutional challenges to their actions. 
Training must be implemented to ensure that all staff comply, since violating these policies can 
result in lengthy, expensive, and very public litigation. In the ideal world of education, the courts 
would recognize the schools’ interests in protecting their educational environment. However, in 
2014, the harsh reality is quite different.  
